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THE HATCH ACT REAFFIRMED: DEISE OF
OVERBREADTH REVIEW?
The Burger Court is "a Court in transition"' and Court watchers anxiously
await signs of emerging trends or changes in policy. It is the task of this Com-
ment to identify an emerging policy change in the overbreadth doctrine. Two re-
cent cases, United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of
Letter Carriers2 and Broadrick v. Oklahoma,3 will be reviewed in depth. Then,
the effect of these and other recent cases upon the overbreadth doctrine will be
examined.
I. Two METHODS OF JUDICIAL REvIEw
There are two methods of judicial review by which the Supreme Court seeks
to eliminate unconstitutional statutory inhibitions upon rights and privileges:
(1) review of a statute "as applied" and (2) review of a statute "on its face."
The "as applied" method is the more traditional and restrained method of judicial
review. It is based upon the concept that the judicial resolution of a constitutional
controversy is justified only if it is unavoidable in rendering a decision in a par-
ticular case before the Court.L4 In applying this method, the Court considers the
constitutional validity of a statute only in terms of its factual application in the
case before it.
The other method of judicial review is facial review-the determination of
whether or not a statute is invalid on its face, regardless of the constitutional
status of the particular complainant's conduct. Such an aggressive method of
review is employed only in reviewing statutes which affect first amendment rights,
and finds its justification in the favored status of the rights of expression and
association.5 The rationale of facial review is based upon the assumption that
some statutes have a deterrent, or "chilling", effect upon the exercise of first
amendment rights and privileges. This deterrence and the resulting loss in exercise
of precious freedoms concern the Court more than any actual punishment.7 In
1. Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice
Powell, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1001 (1972).
2. 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
3. 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973).
4. "In no area of adjudication is the adage 'silence is golden' more pertinent.. than in
the series of problems to which a judicial reconciliation between liberty and order gives
rise. . . When there is no duty to speak on such issues there is a duty not to speak." Poulos
v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 414 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940). See generally Calm, The Firstness
of the First Amendment, 65 Yale LJ. 464 (1956); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1182 (1959).
6. The notion of a constitutional "chill" was first mentioned in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7. "The threat of sanctions may deter... almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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order to remove this "chill" and prevent an irretrievable loss in freedom of
expression, the Court is willing to modify traditional standards of review. 8
A statute may be said to have a chilling effect if it is either vague or overbroad.
"[A]n enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly de-
fined." 9 Statutory vagueness may mean excessive delegation of discretion to
enforcement officials without adequate standards,' or simply a lack of adequate
warning to the innocent." In addition, in the area of the first amendment privi-
leges, vagueness is so closely related to overbreadth that the two may be practi-
cally indistinguishable.' 2
An overbroad statute, however, may or may not suffer from the defect of
vagueness.' 3 The Court may declare a "clear and precise enactment"" overbroad
8. "We have molded both substantive rights and procedural remedies in the face of varied
conflicting interests to conform to our overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the
'chilling effect' upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms ... ." Walker v. City of Birming-
ham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 432-33 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Hobbs v. Thompson, 448
F.2d 456, 459-60 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional
Law, 69 Coium. L. Rev. 808 (1969). However, a recent step backward in "chilling effect"
doctrine is Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). In that case the Court found that petitioners'
claim that their first amendment rights were chilled by the existence of a data-gathering
system did not constitute a justiciable controversy because there was no showing of harm.
9. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The void-for-vagueness doctrine
was conceived during the era of substantive due process and was used successfully in cases
involving regulatory or economic-control legislation. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931) ;
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385
(1925); International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914). During
that time, vagueness allegations in free speech cases were not well received. Fox v. Washington,
236 U.S. 273 (1915); Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), overruled
by Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). More recently, however, the doctrine
has been used by the Supreme Court in free speech cases. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincin-
nati, 402 U.S. 611, 613-14 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instr., 368 U.S. 278, 287
(1961). For a comprehensive discussion of the vagueness doctrine see Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
10. E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) ; Ashton v. Kentucky, 384
U.S. 195, 200 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 261-64 (1937).
11. E.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926);
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
12. "The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon ab-
sence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative
powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the
existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963). See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,
83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 845 n.5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Overbreadth Doctrine].
13. A statute may be drawn precisely but still be overbroad in its coverage. See, e.g.,
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-16 (1964). However, Professor Freund has
characterized overbreadth as actually being a problem of latent vaguenes. P. Freund, The
Supreme Court of the United States: Its Business, Purposes, and Performance 67-68 (1961).
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if it "sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under [the first
amendment] ."1 The Court will examine the statutory language in order to deter-
mine if there is a substantial possibility either that the statute could be applied to
punish constitutionally protected activity, or that those affected by the statute
might realistically fear such an application.'0
Within the overbreadth doctrine there are two minor themes or considerations:
(1) Is there a compelling state interest? and (2) Did the state utilize the least
drastic alternative to protect or further that interest? It is generally agreed that
a "substantial infringement" of first amendment rights requires a compelling
state interest for its justification.' 7 If a statute is drafted in vague or broad
prohibitions, it will be more difficult for the courts to ascertain what interest the
government seeks to protect i8
Once the Court determines that there is a compelling state interest to be pro-
tected, it turns to a consideration of whether or not the legislature has employed
the least restrictive alternative available to protect adequately or further that
interest.19 Regardless of the enunciated method, the Supreme Court must balance
14. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). Statutes affecting first amend-
ment rights must be "narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct" Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940). The Supreme Court recently has utilized the doctrine
of overbreadth to rule unconstitutional many statutes regulating first amendment rights. E.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) ; United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967) ;
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18-19
(1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488-90 (1960). In Button the Court stated: "Because First Amendment freedoms need breath-
ing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 371
U.S. 415, 433.
15. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
16. Overbreadth Doctrine 856.
17. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
18. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272-82 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); La-
mont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U-S. 398, 407 (1963); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937). Without
a clear statement of legislative policy, those responsible for the statute's implementation are
left without guidance as to its proper application. Greene v. McElroy, 360 US. 474, 507
(1959); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See Overbreadth Doctrine 856-58.
19. "The issue remains whether, in light of the particular kind of restriction upon indi-
vidual liberty which a regulation entails, it is reasonable for a legislature to choose that form
of regulation rather than others less restrictive. To that determination, the range of judg-
ment easily open to a legislature in considering the relative degrees of efficiency of alternative
means in achieving the end it seeks is pertinent." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 494 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In non-first amendment cases, the doctrine of least restrictive alternative means simply
that the government, when faced with a number of equally effective means to a desired end,
must choose the one which is least restrictive of constitutional rights. Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969). In Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) the Supreme Court, in finding that an economic statute un-
necessarily interfered with interstate commerce, considered possible alternative legislative
19731
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conflicting interests and values in examining a statute which inhibits first amend-
ment rights.20 If an important, general interest of the government, such as na-
tional security, were to be weighed against individual rights and freedoms, the
scales would rarely tip in the individual's favor. 21 Instead, the Court will balance
the "state's interest in the added effectiveness of the chosen means against the
individual interest in the use of less drastic ones." 22 An overbroad statute, while
perhaps very effective and based upon a legitimate state interest, may not be
upheld if the loss of freedoms involved outweighs the efficiency gained by the
breadth of the statute's coverage.
Overbreadth review is facial review; it does not depend upon the privileged
nature of the complainant's activity.23 This is justified by the chilling effect of the
overbroad statute which would deter the "very litigants whose complaint is neces-
sary under the as applied method to bring about erosion of overbreadth. '"2' The
uncertainty that their action would eventually be declared privileged by the
courts, and the cost of litigation, would discourage many individuals from exer-
cising first amendment rights.2r This lack of dependence on the plaintiff's factual
situation "renders an overbreadth claim 'ripe' almost whenever asserted. ' 20
However, the suit might still be found to be premature if it is uncertain whether
or not the statute applies to the complainant's activity.27
Since a finding of overbreadth depends only upon possible, rather than actual,
unconstitutional applications of a statute, the possibility of such applications must
be substantial or legislation would be impossible.281 Whether or not statutory
approaches. But since then it consistently has refused to do so, claiming it is "not [its] func-
tion." E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967). For a discussion of the Court's
policy statement in Robel see Gunther, Reflections on Robe]: It's Not What the Court Did
But the Way That It Did It, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1140 (1968). An analysis of the applicability
of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in cases involving economic regulations which have
been attacked under the due process clause may be found in Struve, The Less-Restrictive-
Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1463 (1967). A compre-
hensive summary of the use of the doctrine in several areas of the law may be found In
Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah L. Rev. 254 (1964).
20. Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah L. Rev. 254,
255 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464, 466
(1969).
21. Cf. T. Emerson, A System of Freedom of Expression 116-17 (1970).
22. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464, 468 (1969).
23. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-16 (1964); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
24. Overbreadth Doctrine 855.
25. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 486-87, 490-91 (1965) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964).
26. Overbreadth Doctrine 864. Cf. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1379-80 (1973).
27. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312 (1967). See Harrison
v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959).
28. "A substantial overbreadth rule is implicit in the chilling effect rationale. While it Is
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overbreadth is substantial depends upon the type of statute under review. One
commentator has suggested three types of overbroad statutes affecting first
amendment rights: (1) "censorial" laws which burden the expression of definable
viewpoints; (2) "inhibitory" laws which restrict expression and association but
are neutral as to the viewpoints advocated; and (3) "remedial" laws which inhibit
first amendment activities in order to promote values which are the very concern
of the amendment.29 Of the three, censorial statutes require the least substantial
degree of overbreadth to trigger overbreadth review.30 The Court has struck down
inhibitory statutes which make no attempt to define clearly the harm they seek
to prevent or set forth clear standards for their application.31 When examining
a remedial statute, the Court will tolerate a considerable amount of imprecision in
drafting.32
The ready availability of facial review is not its only justification for use in
examination of overbroad statutes. The as applied method of review is unsuitable
for dealing with the defects of an overbroad statute. Unless the statute lends
itself to a broad per se restriction, as applied adjudication would not lessen the
"chill" of an overbroad statute. Ad hoc adjudication of unconstitutional applica-
tions of an overbroad statute would offer no guidance to the potential actor
covered by the literal language of the statute unless "his situation [were] on all
fours with that of an earlier claimant." 33 For this reason such overbroad statutes
must be invalidated completely and sent back to the legislature for redrafting.
II. Two RECENT CASES
Recently the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of two similar
statutes which impose serious restrictions on first amendment freedoms, rejecting
complainants' allegations of vagueness and overbreadth in United States Civil
Service Commission v. Natioiazl Association of Letter Carriersa4 and Broadrick v.
Oklahoma.3 5
true that even the most carefully drawn statutes may have some chilling effect on privileged
activity ... still the presumption must be that only substantially overbroad laws set up the
kind and degree of chill that is judicially cognizable." Overbreadth Doctrine 859.
29. Id. at 918.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (employer propaganda
during union representation elections); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (FCC regulations designed to promote fairness in media treatment of controversial
issues); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (regulation of lobbying).
33. Overbreadth Doctrine 872. For a comprehensive discussion of the failure of the as
applied method in curing the chill of overbroad statutes see id. at 865-910.
34. 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
35. 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973).
1973]
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A. Letter Carriers
The Letter Carriers case began when the National Association of Letter
Carriers and six federal employees, in a class action,80 sought a declaratory
judgment that the provision of the Hatch Act that prohibits political activity by
employees of the Executive branch317 was unconstitutional on its face, and re-
quested an injunction against its enforcement.38 Each plaintiff alleged that the
Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or about to enforce, the Act's prohibi-
tions against political activity with respect to certain conduct in which he was
about to engage.3 9 Finding the constitutional question substantial, a three-judge
court was convened. 40
The three-judge court, in a two-to-one decision,41 ruled that the challenged
provision of the Hatch Act was unconstitutional on its face and enjoined its
enforcement. The court recognized "an obvious, well-established governmental
interest in restricting political activities by federal employees," 42 but found that
there were such serious defects in the drafting of the Act that it could not be
upheld under contemporary first amendment standards of review. 43 Judge Gesell,
writing for the majority, found the Act to be "a classic case of a statute which in
36. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp.
578 (D.D.C. 1972).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "(a) An employee in an Executive
agency or an individual employed by the government of the District of Columbia may not
•.. (2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns. For the pur-
pose of this subsection, the phrase 'an active part in political management or in political
campaigns' means those acts of political management or political campaigning which were
prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by deter-
minations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President."
38. Six local Democratic and Republican political committees also sought to join the
action as plaintiffs and include 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (3) (1970) (imposing similar prohibitions
on state employees covered by the Act) in the constitutional challenge. The district court
held that none of the plaintiffs properly could represent all state employees covered by the
Act. Therefore only § 7324(a) (2), as it affects federal employees, was considered. 346 F. Supp.
at 579 n.1.
39. 93 S. Ct. at 2883. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), an earlier
challenge to the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, the Court refused to allow several govern-
ment employees to join the suit because they had not yet violated the Act and therefore did
not present a justiciable controversy. Only five years later, in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952), the Court reached the merits without discussing justiciability. In Adler,
plaintiff teachers challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute designed to rid the
New York public school system of subversive influences, but they did not allege violation of
the statute or any intention to do so.
40. The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1970). An
appeal from the decision of a three-judge court may be taken directly to the Supreme Court.
41. Judge Gesell wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Parker concurred. Judge
MacKinnon dissented.
42. 346 F. Supp. at 579.
43. "Prohibitions are worded in generalities that lack precision. There is no standard. No
one can read the Act and ascertain what it prohibits." Id. at 582 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 42
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its application has a 'chilling effect' unacceptable under the First Amendment.' 44
However, the Supreme Court reversed in a six-to-three decision, finding the Act
neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad. 45
Both the High Court and the three-judge court set forth legislative histories
of the Hatch Act. 46 To facilitate a better understanding of the issues involved, a
brief history is set forth here also.
When Congress enacted the Hatch Act in 193 9,47 control over the political
conduct of government employees long had been in effect. The Civil Service Act
of 188348 forbade employees in the civil service to coerce the political action of
any person or to interfere with elections by use of their official authority or
influence. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt extended the range of controls
by an executive order which prohibited not only coercion, but voluntary political
activity as well.49 During the 1938 election much publicity was given the misuse
of federal funds slated for emergency public relief programs.50 In response to
pressure from the public, Congress enacted the Hatch Act in 1939 to prevent
"pernicious" political activity allegedly engaged in by public employees in con-
nection with these programs.51 Though the Hatch Act contained essentially the
same prohibitory language as the 1907 executive order,52 its application as
44. Id. at 584.
45. 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973). Justice White wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justice Douglas filed
a dissenting opinion in which justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
46. 93 S. Ct. at 2886-89; 346 F. Supp. at 580-82.
47. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147.
48. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403.
49. Exec. Order of June 3, 1907 provided: "Persons who by the provisions of these rules are
in the competitive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to
express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take no active part in political
management or in political campaigns."
50. 84 Cong. Rec. 9598 (1939) (remarks of Rep. Taylor); Note, The Hatch Act-
Political Immaturity?, 45 Geo. L.J. 233, 234-35 (1956-57).
51. 1 Report of the Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel 9-10
(1968). (This three volume report was compiled by an advisory commission created by
Congress in 1966 (Act of Oct. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-617, 80 Stat. 868) and contains infor-
mation on federal, state and foreign restrictions on the political activity of public employees.)
But see Mosher, Government Employees Under the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 233, 234-37
(1947). For a discussion of the political atmosphere at the time the Act was passed see gener-
ally P. Herring, The Politics of Democracy 223-24 (1940); 2 S. Morison & H. Commager,
The Growth of the American Republic 744 (5th ed. 1962); G. Stimpson, A Book About
American Politics 106-07 (1952).
52. The word "privately" was deleted from the version passed by Congress. The Hatch
Act as originally passed appears in Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147. It was amended
in 1940 to extend coverage of the act to employees of the District of Columbia and to em-
ployees of federally financed projects of states and municipalities. Act of July 19, 1940, ch.
640, 54 Stat. 767. In 1950 it was amended again to leave to the discretion of the Civil Service
Commission whether or not violation warranted removal. Act of Aug. 25, 1950, ch. 784, 64
Stat. 475. The principal provisions of the Act were enacted as 5 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1303, 1501-03
& 7324-27 upon the formal enactment of Title 5 by the Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
extended to many federal employees not previously covered. Among the activities
it proscribed was "an active part in political management or in political cam-
paigns," language defined as incorporating the pre-1940 decisions of the Civil
Service Commission,5 3 except that such an employee "retains the right to vote as
he chooses and to express his opinion on political subjects and candidates.'*4
It is this definition of political activity which the three-judge court found
offensive to first amendment standards. 5  The court discussed the possibility that
the pre-1940 rulings were to serve as an upper limit on prohibited political
activity, while themselves being cut back by the qualifying provision in section
7324(b). However, the court found that "no constitutionally acceptable mech-
anism was provided for accomplishing this result,"50 and the statute was therefore
vague and overbroad.
The lower court decision came as a surprise to many who believed that the
question of the Act's constitutionality had been settled in United Public Workers
v. Mitchell5 7 which had upheld the statute. Although the Mitchell decision and
the Hatch Act itself have been criticized severely, 5 in subsequent challenges to
the Hatch Act, the federal courts have felt bound to follow Mitchell and uphold
the constitutionality of the Act. 59
89-554, 80 Stat. 378. For a more detailed legislative history of the Hatch Act see Note, The
Hatch Act-Political Immaturity?, 45 Geo. L.J. 233 (1956-57). See also Minge, Federal Re-
strictions on the Political Activities of State and Local Employees, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 493
(1973) ; Comment, The "Riddle" of the Hatch Act: Statutory Interpretation and the Narrow-
ing of Vague Laws, 53 Boston U.L. Rev. 122 (1973); Note, Freedom of Political Activity
For Civil Servants: An Alternative to Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
626 (1973) ; 47 St. John's L. Rev. 509 (1973) ; 26 Vand. L. Rev. 355 (1973).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2) (1970). For a general index of these rulings see 1 United States
Civil Serv. Comn'n, Political Activity Reporter iil-xxvi (1971).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(b) (1970).
55. "It is immediately unclear how the incorporation by reference and this qualifying pro-
vision were intended to operate together." 346 F. Supp. at 581.
56. Id. at 582.
57. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
58. E.g., Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 472 (Sth Cir. 1971); Mancuso v. Taft, 341
F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973); Bruff, Unconstitutional
Conditions upon Public Employment: New Departures in the Protection of First Amend-
ment Rights, 21 Hastings L.J. 129 (1969); Minge, Federal Restrictions on the Political
Activities of State and Local Employees, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1973); Nelson, Public
Employees and the Right to Engage in Political Activity, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 27 (1955); Rose,
A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 510 (1962); Comment, The Hatch Act
-A Constitutional Restraint of Freedom?, 33 Albany L. Rev. 345 (1969); Note, Freedom
of Political Activity For Civil Servants: An Alternative to Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act,
41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 626 (1973); Comment, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment,
78 Yale L.J. 842 (1969); 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 736 (1970); 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 750 (1967); 47
St. John's L. Rev. 509 (1973); 26 Vand. L. Rev. 355 (1973).
59. Regional Park Auth. v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Kearney v. Macy, 409 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970); Palmer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th
Cir. 1962); Engelhardt v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 304 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1962);
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In Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court indicated its belief that Mitchell had
decided the issue in question.60 Although the district court had not challenged the
"well-established governmental interest in restricting political activities by federal
employees,"'6 1 the Court felt constrained to articulate what it believed to be the
legislative policy behind the Act.62 The Act itself offered little help, stating only
that its purpose is "to prevent pernicious political activity. ' '6a
The Court discussed no less than four separate reasons for the restrictions on
the political activities of federal employees: (1) the impartial execution of the
laws; 64  (2) the appearance that government employees are not practicing
"political justice;" 65 (3) the prevention of employing the government work
force "to build a powerful, invincible and perhaps corrupt political machine;"0 16
and (4) freedom of government employees from pressure "to vote in a certain
way or perform political chores.16 7 It is not surprising that the Court expended so
much energy setting forth purposes of the Act, since it was dealing with a statute
which places serious limitations on first amendment rights. It is important when
examining such a statute that the Court determine that there exists a state
interest which justifies such an intrusion.68 It is not sufficient merely to state that
"the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and 'the speech of its
employees that differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.' "69 Government employees
may not be stripped of their constitutional freedoms as an incident of employ-
ment.7 0 In his dissent, Justice Douglas stated that it is "of no concern of Govern-
Fishkin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (NJ). Cal. 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Democratic State Central Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp.
1009 (D. Md. 1966); Gray v. Macy, 239 F. Supp. 658 (D. Ore. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 358 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1966); Wilson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 136
F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1955). Contra, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F.
Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
60. 93 S. Ct. at 2891. The statement "[wle unhesitatingly reaffirm the Mitchell holding,"
id. at 2886, might come as a surprise to many who thought it "a safe assumption that United
Public Workers retains little vitality today." T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expres-
sion 587 (1970) (italics deleted).
61. 346 F. Supp. at 579.
62. 93 S. Ct. at 2886-89.
63. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147.
64. 93 S. Ct. at 2890.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2891. The Hatch Act restrictions are commonly presumed to protect three inter-
ests: (1) the interests of the public employees to be protected from political pressure; (2)
the interest of the public in an efficient Civil Service system based on merit; and (3) the
interest of the public in receiving unbiased service, regardless of political affiliation. Hearings
on S. 3374 and S. 3417 Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 171 (1972).
68. See note 17 supra.
69. 93 S. Ct. at 2890.
70. In upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, the Mitchell Court had relied
upon the doctrine that public employment is a privilege rather than a right. This doctrine
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ment what an employee does in his or her spare time ... unless what he or she
does impairs efficiency. ."... ,,- This is perhaps an overstatement. The government
may in fact find a very real and compelling need to restrain its employees from
exercising certain constitutional rights, on or off the job. However, since the
statute concerns the rights of speech and association, it is imperative that the
government use the least restrictive alternative available to it.7 2
When the Hatch Act was first challenged in Mitchell, that Court used a
"rational basis" test to uphold its constitutionality.7 In his dissent in Letter
Carriers, Justice Douglas stated, "what may have been unclear to some in
Mitchell should by now be abundantly clear to all. We deal here with a First
Amendment right . . ."' The high regard in which we hold first amendment
rights demands an aggressive review of statutes which seek to regulate those
rights. Instead, the Court stated that "[p Ierhaps Congress at some time will come
to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but
that is its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to
dispute it."175 The language used is very much the language of a rational basis
test. The Court even admitted that a less drastic alternative may exist: "It may
be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection .... 7o But
the Court bowed to what it referred to as the "joint judgment of the Executive
and Congress."177
was first articulated by Justice, then Judge, Holmes in the often-quoted statement, "[t]he
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892). Mitchell cited McAuliffe in a footnote. 330 U.S. at 99 n.34. Recent cases, however,
have rejected this theory. In 1971 Justice Blackmun stated, "This Court now has rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See, e.g.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
627 n.6 (1969) ; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ; Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See also
Van Astyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv.
L. Rev. 1439 (1968).
71. 93 S. Ct. at 2906 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
73. "For regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything
more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the pub-
lic service." 330 U.S. at 101.
74. 93 S. Ct. at 2906 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2891 (opinion of the Court).
76. Id.
77. Id. In fact, there have been bills introduced in Congress which would narrow
the Hatch Act's restrictions. Hearings on S. 3374 and S. 3417 Before the Senate Comm. on
Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 8, 171 (1972). It has been suggested
that a statute be drawn which would prohibit only coercion. United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 113 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ; Note, Freedom of Political Activity
For Civil Servants: An Alternative to Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
626, 641 (1973). It has also been suggested that the United States adopt the British system
which restricts the political activity of certain categories of civil service employees depending
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The Court examined 5 C.F.R. Part 733, promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission, as the statute in question.78 However, as the dissent pointed out,
the Civil Service Commission was never given the power or authority to adjust or
narrow the definition of political activity given in section 7324 (a) (2).YO As the
dissent also pointed out, 5 C.F.R. 733.122 (b) is an opened-ended list which states
that "[a]ctivities prohibited... include but are not limited to [the following]."8°
If the original definition of section 7324(a) (2) were overbroad at the time of its
passage, the interpretive decisions of the Civil Service Commission would be of
little help in removing the chill of such an overbroad statute. Ad hoc adjudication
of an overbroad statute offers little guidance to those about to engage in an
activity as yet unconsidered. 8' The Court was not bothered by this possibility,
because "the Commission has established a procedure by which an employee in
doubt about the validity of a proposed course of conduct may seek and obtain
advice from the Commission and thereby remove any doubt there may be as to
the meaning of the law, at least insofar as the Commission itself is concerned. ' -
The district court had found such prior restraint unacceptable: "Speech must not
be controlled and subject to censure so that one cannot respond without prior
clearance to the demands of free expression in ordinary daily affairs. ' 'ss Thus the
Court appears to have placed a new restriction on its use of overbreadth review.
If a procedure is provided whereby one can obtain a prior interpretation of a
contemplated act, and there has been a history of ad hoc determinations under an
originally overbroad statute, the Court will not review the statute facially, but
will determine its constitutionality in terms of its past applications.
B. Broadrick
Another, and perhaps more serious, limitation appears to have been imposed
upon the overbreadth doctrine by Broadrick, the companion case to Letter
Carriers.
upon the influence they are able to exert in their official capacity. See, e.g., Christoph,
Political Rights and Administrative Impartiality in the British Civil Service, 51 Am. PoL Sci.
Rev. 67 (1957); Epstein, Political Sterilization of Civil Servants: The United States and
Great Britain, 10 Pub. Ad. Rev. 281, 285 (1950). See generally Esman, The Hatch Act-A
Reappraisal, 60 Yale L.J. 986 (1951) ; Minge, Federal Restrictions on the Political Activities
of State and Local Employees, 57 M[inn. L. Rev. 493, 540-41 (1973); Note, The Hatch
Act-Political Immaturity?, 45 Geo. L.J. 233, 246-49 (1956.57); 47 St. John's L. Rev. 509,
526 (1973).
78. 93 S. Ct. at 2897. The Court set forth the pertinent regulations of S C.F.R. Part 733.
Id. at 2896 n.21.
79. Id. at 2907 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. See note 33 supra. In Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1973), the government
argued that the terms of the article of the Uniform Code of Military justice which authorized
the court-martial of a commissioned officer for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
were made certain by two hundred years of interpretation. The court found this argument
"unpersuasive where the proscribed conduct is speech arguably protected by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 794.
82. 93 S. Ct. at 2897-98.
83. 346 F. Supp. at 585.
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In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,84 a class action brought on behalf of all classified
employees in the State of Oklahoma, three employees of the Oklahoma Corpora-
tion Commission sought a declaratory judgment that a portion of the Oklahoma
Merit System of Personnel Administration Act8 r be found unconstitutional and
asked that its enforcement be enjoined. The statute is similar to the Hatch Act, as
are many state laws and city ordinances, sometimes known as "little Hatch
Acts."8' 6 The constitutional validity of such statutes has been challenged in both
federal and state courts with varying results.87 In Broadrick the district court
found that the statute was not vague or overbroad as alleged and, as a finding of
fact, found that plaintiffs failed to establish that the challenged provisions "cast
any chilling effect upon any state employee's First Amendment rights."88 Having
noted probable jurisdiction, 9 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
three-judge court in a five-to-four decision.0
The majority opinion by Justice White began by citing the "important state
interests" served by such restrictions on political activity. In this case the Justice
84. 338 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla. 1972), aff'd, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973).
85. "No employee in the classified service .. .shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, receive,
or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription or con-
tribution for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose ....
"No employee in the classified service shall be a member of any national, state or local
committee of a political party, or an officer or member of a committee of a partisan political
club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office, or shall take part
in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except to
exercise his right as a citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast his vote." Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 818 (1965).
86. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 584 (1970). For a comprehensive
compilation of similar state acts see 93 S. Ct. at 2912 n.2.
87. Federal courts found such statutes to be unconstitutional in Hobbs v. Thompson,
448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972). Many state
courts have ruled similar statutes unconstitutional. E.g., Huerta v. Flood, 103 Ariz. 608, 447
P.2d 866 (1968); Bagley v. Washington Twp. Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) ; City of Miami v. Sterbenz, 203 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1967) ; De Stefano v.
Wilson, 96 N.J. Super. 592, 233 A.2d 682 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1967); Minielly v. State, 242
Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
However, some courts have upheld their validity. E.g., Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp.
1281 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n v. Wisconsin Natural Resources
Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (statutes prohibiting civil service employees from
running for public office); State v. Stuler, 122 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1960) (statute prohibiting
public employees from coercing or advising other employees to contribute anything of value
for political purposes) ; Johnson v. Civil Serv. Dep't, 280 Minn. 61, 157 N.W.2d 747 (1968) ;
Ivancie v. Thornton, 250 Ore. 550, 443 P.2d 612 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969)
(statutes prohibiting officeholders from running for partisan office) ; Fire Fighters Local 1645
v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
88. 338 F. Supp. at 715.
89. 409 U.S. 1058 (1972).
90. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist concurred. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Stewart
dissented.
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listed only two governmental interests: (1) job security of civil servants and an
attendant increase in qualified employees, and (2) protection of these employees
from " 'political extortion.'" 91 In his dissent Justice Douglas assumed the state
interest to be the promotion of efficiency, and found the statute to be an obstacle
rather than a means necessary to that end. "A bureaucracy that is alert, vigilant,
and alive is more efficient than one that is quiet and submissive."9 12
The plaintiffs alleged that the Act was vague and overbroad. The Court sum-
marily dismissed the allegation of vagueness. 93 However, the issue of overbreadth
was given extensive treatment.
In essence, the Court refused to apply facial overbreadth review in this case.
The majority opinion stated the principle "that a person to whom a statute
may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other
situations not before the Court."9 4 However, the Court recognized exceptions to
this principle due to "weighty countervailing policies" such as the first amend-
ment.95 Making no attempt to deny that it dealt with first amendment freedoms,
the majority stated that it is "a 'matter of no little difficulty' to determine when
a law may properly be held void on its face and when 'such summary action' is
inappropriate." 96 This is because overbreadth review is "strong medicine"9 7 and
is "employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort."98 Justice White
cited two instances when facial overbreadth will not be applied: (1) "when a
limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute '9 and
(2) when overbreadth claims are "invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct."10 The Justice also stated that
"overbreadth scrutiny has generally been somewhat less rigid in the context of
statutes regulating conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment, but doing so
in a neutral, noncensorial manner,"''1 1 and then cited three cases involving
"remedial" statutes'0 2 and two cases in which the Court never reached the issue
of overbreadth.103 It is submitted that the standard of review applicable to
remedial statutes may not be used properly in consideration of an inhibitory
91. 93 S. Ct. at 2913.
92. Id. at 2920 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. "We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague. We have little
doubt that § 818 is similarly not so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning.'" Id. at 2913 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 2915.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2917.
97. Id. at 2916.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2917.
101. Id.
102. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
103. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ; Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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statute such as the Hatch Act.10 4 There is a grave and important difference be-
tween remedial and inhibitory statutes and the same standard can not be applied
properly to both. In the case of remedial statutes, first amendment rights are in
conflict with first amendment rights. A less rigid standard is proper in these cases
as there is an overall gain in first amendment freedoms, although the drafting of
the statute might render it vague or broad enough to encompass possible uncon-
stitutional applications. 05 However, this lesser standard is not appropriate in
reviewing inhibitory statutes. Although the standard of review is not as strict as
for "censorial" statutes, of which the Court is particularly suspicious, inhibitory
statutes are not given the same presumption of validity as remedial statutes. Nor
should they be. Even though such statutes are not as offensive to our democracy
as statutes which inhibit expression because of the ideology of the speaker, any
statute which inhibits the freedom of expression of a large group of people de-
serves a strict review.
The Court concluded that the method of facial review was inappropriate in
Broadrick because "where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe
that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well."'1 6 Justice White had advanced this theory in another context earlier-in
his dissent in Coates v. City of Cincinnati.07 There, it was rejected implicitly by
the majority. In this case it seems particularly inappropriate because, as Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent, both the speech and the conduct here involved
are protected equally by the first amendment.108
III. IMPLICATIONS
This new speech/conduct distinction imposed on overbreadth review in the
Broadrick case is neither logical nor helpful. Justice Brennan found the distinc-
tion "obscure."' 0 9 It seems more likely that the use of the speech/conduct dis-
tinction in this case was merely a means to sidestep the use of the overbreadth
doctrine.
Court watchers have predicted that the Burger Court would make a sharp
break with the constitutional directions of the Warren Court by taking an extreme
"law and order" stance and turning a deaf ear to claims based on freedoms of the
individual. 10 Upon examining the decisions of the 1971 term of the Burger Court,
Professor Gunther remarked:
The changes were marginal, not cataclysmic. "Retreats" were more typically refusals
to extend Warren Court tendencies and narrow readings of Warren Court precedents:
104. The Hatch Act has been referred to as "the paradigm of an undifferentiated inhibitory
law designed to serve a prophylactic purpose." Overbreadth Doctrine 922 n.307.
105. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
106. 93 S. Ct. at 2918.
107. 402 U.S. 611, 620-21 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
108. 93 S. Ct. at 2926 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2925.
110. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 2, 1972, § 1, at 18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 24, 1972, at 28,
col. 3; Editorial, Retreat on Rights, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1972 at 44, col. 1; The Nixon Way,
Newsweek, June 5, 1972 at 39; The Nixon Radicals, Time, June 5, 1972, at 65.
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not firm strides to the rear but sidesteps and refusals to step forward were character-
istic of last term's changes.'
At the close of the 1972 term, however, it is now apparent that the Burger Court
intends not only to refuse to extend the policies of the Warren Court, but also to
make a wholesale retreat.
One such retreat may be seen in the field of obscenity. Under the test of
Memoirs v. Massachusetts,1 -' material had to be utterly without redeeming social
value to be "obscene." In California v. LaRue'1 3 the Court exhibited its dissatis-
faction with the Memoirs standard by refusing to apply it. In LaRue the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting obscene performances in bars.
The basis for its refusal to apply the Memoirs standard as set forth by Justice
Rehnquist, 1 4 was threefold: (1) the subject of the prohibition was more "action"
than "speech"; 11 (2) the statute did not impose an absolute ban on the activity,
only the denial of a license; l"0 and (3) the regulation of such behavior was per-
missible under the twenty-first amendment." 7 In his dissent Justice Marshall
pointed out the weaknesses of the majority's reasoning: (1) the speech/conduct
distinction was an improper one since drama is also protected under the Memoirs
standard;" 8 and (2) the state may not infringe a first amendment right by the
denial of a privilege or benefit. 1 9 Even if LaRue is read narrowly as being decided
under the twenty-first amendment,"O it seems clear that the Court was rendering
a rather tortured reading of the Constitution to avoid the stringent Memoirs
standard.12'
111. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1972).
A critical analysis of Professor Gunther's interpretation of the "new" equal protection may be
found in Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham
L. Rev. 605 (1973).
112. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The decision announced a three-pronged test for a finding of
obscenity: "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 418.
113. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
114. Chief Judge Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blacknun and Powell joined
in the majority. Dissenting were Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall.
115. 409 U.S. at 117.
116. Id. at 118.
117. Id- at 114-16.
118. Id. at 130 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 136 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. In his dissent Justice Marshall stated: "Only last Term, we held that the State's
conceded power to license the distribution of intoxicating beverages did not justify use of
that power in a manner that conflicted with the Equal Protection Clause. I am at a loss to
understand why the Twenty-first Amendment should be thought to override the Fiust Amend-
ment but not the Fourteenth." Id. at 135 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121. It is interesting to note that although Justice Marshall maintained that the regula-
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In the closing weeks of the 1972 term, the Supreme Court decided six cases now
commonly referred to as the "obscenity cases.1 122 The new standard announced in
Miller v. California123 represents a definite change in the Court's role as protector
of first amendment freedoms from an aggressive role toward a more passive
approach. The Court began by reiterating the rule that obscene material is
unprotected by the first amendment. 124 It then went on to announce that the
decision as to what constitutes obscene material will be judged by contemporary
community standards of the local community because "[p]eople in different
States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled
by the absolutism of imposed uniformity."1'2  The implications of this decision
are far-reaching.
12 6
Having examined the signs foretelling the abandonment of the Warren Court's
obscenity standard, it is the contention of this Comment, even at the risk of mak-
ing another "excessively gloomy"' 27 prediction, that similar signs now foreshadow
an abandonment of overbreadth review as a means of first amendment protection.
A dissatisfaction with overbreadth review may be seen on the part of a number
of the Justices on the present Supreme Court. In Coates v. City of Cincinnati128
Justice White, joined in his dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, advanced the speech/conduct distinction as a limitation on
overbreadth review.1 29 Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Gooding v. Wilson,1 0
stated that the overbreadth doctrine "urgently needs re-examination."'' Chief
Justice Burger, in a separate dissent in Gooding, made a direct attack on the
very foundations of the overbreadth doctrine. He stated that in many of the
tions were overbroad, id. at 125, the majority did not consider the question. Nor did the
majority in the "obscenity cases" consider the issue of overbreadth.
122. Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 2796
(1973); Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93
S. Ct. 2628 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super Sam. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
123. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). The Court held that obscenity was "'to be defined by refer-
ence to community standards . . . not a national standard . . . .'" Id. at 2619.
124. Id. at 2613.
125. Id. at 2620.
126. Will "community standards" next define what constitutes "fighting words" or "clear
and present danger?"
127. Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice
Powell, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1001, 1002 (1972).
128. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
129. Id. at 618-21 (White, J., dissenting).
The speech/conduct distinction seems to be a thread running throughout the first amend.
ment jurisprudence of the Burger Court. Consider the following language from Miller:
"Although we are not presented here with the problem of regulating lewd public conduct
itself, the States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct than to suppress
depictions or descriptions of the same behavior." Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2616 n.8
(1973).
130. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
131. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Court's overbreadth decisions "the statute's improper sweep and deterrent poten-
tial were amply documented by the very facts of the case before the Court."' 3 2 He
went on to state that Cox v. Louisiana33-an overbreadth decision "heavily relied
on by the majority"'34-had as its primary holding that "the statute had been
unconstitutionally applied to appellant's conduct as revealed by the record before
the Court."'135 The Chief Justice seems to be implying that a more traditional
approach toward standing would be more appropriate in first amendment cases.
Recent cases have seen a majority of the Court, rather than a few dissenters,
expressing misgivings about the overbreadth doctrine by avoiding a studied
adherence to precedent. Police Department v. Mosley, 13 although well suited
factually to a decision on substantive first amendment grounds or overbreadth
review, was actually decided on equal protection grounds, even though the Court
utilized the language of overbreadth review.' 37 A "weakening Court support for
first amendment rights in general"' 38 has been suggested as a possible explanation
for its course of action in Mosley.
In Broadrick we have seen the speech/action limitation advocated by Justice
White in Coates become a reality. Next term perhaps we shall witness the imposi-
tion of another limitation,139 or possibly a total abandonment of the overbreadth
doctrine as a method of first amendment review. Professor Gunther has said that
"[t]he Warren Court's wide open door for free speech claimants was closed
somewhat, to be sure"'14 by the Burger Court. It is only hoped that the door
will not be slammed shut and kept tightly closed.
132. Id. at 532 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
134. 405 U.S. at 532 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
135. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
137. "Given what Chicago tolerates from labor picketing, the excesses of some nonlabor
picketing may not be controlled by a broad ordinance prohibiting both peaceful and violent
picketing. Such excesses 'can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes'.... Chicago's ordi-
nance imposes a selective restriction on expressive conduct far 'greater than is essential to the
furtherance of [a substantial governmental] interest."' Id. at 101-02.
138. 8 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 469, 481 (1973).
139. For a suggestion that overbreadth review should be limited to review of state
statutes see Comment, The "Riddle" of the Hatch Act: Statutory Interpretation and the
Narrowing of Vague Laws, 53 Boston U.L. Rev. 122, 158 (1973).
140. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.12
(1972).
1973]
